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Abstract 
We present a method for determining the presence of an eavesdropper in QKD 
systems without using any public bit comparison. Alice and Bob use a duplex QKD 
channel and the bit transport technique for relays. The only information made public is 
the respective basis choices which must be revealed in standard QKD systems anyway. 
We find that every filtered bit can be used to determine the presence of errors without 
compromising the security. This is an improvement on using a random sample in the 
standard BB84 protocol. 
 
1. Comparison of Bits in the BB84 Protocol 
 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for establishing a secret key between two 
parties, conventionally labelled as Alice and Bob, in which the laws of physics guarantee the security. 
The original technique, known as the BB84 protocol, works by exploiting quantum complementarity to 
encode information in the eigenstates of complementary operators. By randomly selecting which of 
these operators is used to encode the information an eavesdropper cannot retrieve that information 
without disturbing the integrity of some of the transmitted states. Other protocols have since been 
developed, but all rely on either complementarity or quantum correlation to ensure security. For an 
excellent review of the first decade or so of QKD see [1]. We focus here on the BB84 protocol, but 
with suitable adaptation, the technique can be extended to others. 
 Let    and    be the operators representing complementary bases and consider a spin system 
consisting of just two orthonormal states. The eigenstates of the operators    and    are        and  
     , 
respectively. The „+‟ states are given a bit value of 1 and the „−‟ states given a bit value of 0. Thus, 
there are two coding schemes which we can label with X and Y, respectively, in which each transmitted 
quantum state conveys a single bit. In the BB84 protocol the bit values associated with the quantum 
states are used to establish the key. The basic BB84 protocol can be outlined as follows 
1. Alice chooses a coding basis at random 
2. Alice chooses a state from that basis at random 
3. For each well-defined timeslot Alice transmits her chosen quantum state to Bob 
4. Alice records the triple (T, CB, BV) where T is the timeslot, CB is the coding basis and BV is 
the bit value. 
5. For each well-defined timeslot Bob chooses, at random, a coding basis in which to read (i.e. 
measure) the transmitted quantum state 
6. Bob records the triple (T, CB, BV) 
7. Alice and Bob compare T and CB and discard (a) those timeslots in which Bob received no 
state and (b) those timeslots in which their choices of CB differ. 
8. Alice and Bob now have a list in which T and CB are in agreement. A random sample of these 
results is chosen and the value BV compared. This gives an estimate of the error rate for the 
channel. These compared timeslots are discarded. 
9. The remaining timeslots can be renumbered for convenience so that T = 1,2,3,4, . . .,.N where 
N is the total number of successful timeslots. 
 
Step 6 in this protocol represents the end of the quantum transmission and measurement processes. The 
subsequent steps are to do with the processing of the results of the transmission and measurement. 
 In order to ensure that Alice and Bob can match those timeslots for which they should have 
the same BV they must compare their (T, CB) values. In the standard BB84 protocol either Alice or 
Bob (or both) simply publishes their list for the (T, CB) values they used. The other party can then 
compare the two lists and both parties discard any data for which the CB values disagree. For an ideal 
system in the absence of an eavesdropper this procedure ensures that Alice and Bob end up with an 
identical list (T, CB) which is, on average, about half the size of the original. In order to detect the 
presence of errors in this data Alice and Bob select a random sample (step 8 above) and compare the 
actual bit values BV. 
 
2. Detecting the Presence of an Eavesdropper without Bit Comparison 
 In order to detect errors without any public bit comparison Alice and Bob must operate a 
duplex QKD channel. That is Alice transmits photons to Bob, according to the BB84 protocol, and Bob 
transmits photons to Alice according to the BB84 protocol. For convenience we shall imagine these to 
be interleaved so that for odd timeslots a photon is transmitted by Alice whereas Bob transmits in even 
timeslots. These can, in fact, be two entirely separate transmissions; all that is required is that we can 
uniquely correlate a particular transmission with a particular measurement. This uses the „bit transport‟ 
technique developed in [2] where it was used to show how intercept/re-send relays can be used to 
extend the distance of QKD. The basic idea is that separate „good‟ channels are correlated by linking 
different timeslots. The overall effective number of channels that can be used for key exchange is 
unaffected by the introduction of extra relays. We can view the current duplex channel as of the form 
Alice – Relay – Bob folded back on itself. 
 An example of such an interleaved transmission is shown in Table 1. We assume that each 
timeslot is occupied and that the photon reaches its destination. This is, of course, not true in practice, 
but it is easy to accommodate timeslots where nothing is transmitted or received. 
  
 T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
ACB X  X  Y  X  Y  X  Y  Y  Y  X  
ABV 1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  
BCB Y  X  Y  Y  Y  X  X  Y  Y  Y  
BBV ◙  1  1  ◙  1  1  ◙  1  0  ◙  
BCB  X  X  Y  X  X  Y  Y  Y  X  Y 
BBV  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0 
ACB  X  Y  Y  X  Y  X  Y  Y  X  X 
ABV  0  ◙  1  1  1  ◙  0  1  0  ◙ 
 
Alice informs Bob of her basis choices for both transmission and measurement. Bob filters this data 
into 3 sets. The first set is the data for which they expect no agreement because they have chosen 
different bases. In Table 1 this set consists of timeslots 1,4,7,12,13,19 and 20. Bob informs Alice of 
these timeslots and they both discard this data. The second set consists of those remaining timeslots in 
which Alice is the transmitter and in Table 1 consists of the timeslots 3,5,9,11,15 and 17. The third set 
is the remaining data and represents data in which Bob has initiated the transmission and Alice has 
measured in the correct basis. In Table 1 this set comprises the timeslots 2,6,8,10,14,16 and 18. 
 In a perfect world, and in the absence of an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob should agree on the 
data tagged by the timeslots. In order to check this Bob chooses a timeslot from set 2 and reads the 
value of BV he measured. He then looks for an element of set 3 with the same BV. He sends Alice the 
two timeslots. Alice compares the value of BV she has for these two timeslots. They should be equal. If 
there are errors on the channel, either caused by an eavesdropper or by practical imperfections, then 
there is a finite probability that Alice‟s comparison will fail. If Bob transmits a sufficient number of 
these timeslot pairs from set 2 and set 3 the probability of error remaining undetected can be made 
negligibly small. 
 If Bob transmits an extra bit along with each timeslot then the necessity of searching for an 
identical BV from set 3 to match the one from set 2 is unnecessary. The extra bit tells Alice whether to 
perform a bit flip on the bit from set 3 or not. Using this extra bit means that the elements of set 2 and 
set 3 can be used in sequence if so desired. Let‟s see how this works by using the example transmission 
of Table 1. 
  
  In Table 2 we have written BV for each timeslot and separated the data into the two sets, as 
discussed above. 
 
Set 2 (Alice’s Transmission)  Set 3 (Bob’s Transmission) 
Timeslot BV  Timeslot BV 
3 1  2 0 
5 1  6 1 
9 1  8 1 
11 1  10 1 
15 1  14 0 
17 0  16 1 
− −  18 0 
 
After the communication Bob would send Alice a list of triples. The first value is from set 2, the second 
from set 3, and the extra bit tells Alice whether to flip the bit from set 3 with 1 taken to mean to 
perform the flip and 0 taken to mean leave alone. Although, for simplicity here we assume the rule that 
the flip is associated with set 3, all that is required is that one of the bits from set 2 or set 3 is flipped by 
Alice. An alternative way of viewing this is to think of the extra bit as a parity check. For the above 
example Bob would send Alice the following list of triples 
 
(3,2,1) 
(6,5,0) 
(9,8,0) 
(11,10,0) 
(15,14,1) 
(17,16,1) 
 
The first triple, for example, tells Alice to compare her values of BV for timeslots 2 and 3 with the 
value of BV for timeslot 2 flipped. The comparison by Alice will only fail if there has been an error on 
the channel, either from Alice to Bob, or from Bob to Alice. 
 It is important to note that an eavesdropper does not gain any extra information from the extra 
bit that Bob transmits. It is not a parity bit in the usual sense of the meaning. The secret values of BV 
are never revealed. An eavesdropper will know which timeslots are considered legitimate candidates 
for forming a key from the basis information, but she knows this in the standard BB84 protocol too. 
She does, however, gain some extra information from knowing that the bit values in two timeslots are 
the same which she can infer from the timeslots in the list of triples transmitted by Bob. This gives her 
precisely one bit of extra information out of the two possible in these timeslots. She will know that 
timeslots 2 and 3 have bit values of 0,1 or 1,0, but not which of these is correct. 
 In order to eliminate this information gain by Eve, Alice and Bob could adopt the rule that the 
compared timeslots must be understood as follows. If the bit values are 0,1 or 0,0 then this is read as a 
0. If the bit values are 1,0 or 1,1 then this is read as a 1. Alice and Bob reduce their potential key size 
by a factor of 2, but as it is a duplex channel this amounts to the same key potential key size as for the 
single channel BB84 protocol. So in the above example, the first triple sent by Bob is to be understood 
as having the final bit value 1.  
 The fundamental difference between this protocol and BB84 is that the duplex channel and bit 
transport mechanism allows Alice and Bob to use their entire filtered transmission to check for errors 
rather than just use a random sample which must then be discarded. 
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